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Abstract. This paper investigate a competitive facility location problem wherethere are two facilities on alinear market. Customers at ademand point utilizethe facility which seems to be the nearest one from them. We assume that they donot distinguish the small difference between two distances, i.e., they do not always
utilize the nearest facility by strictly measuring physical distance. We formulatethis preference by introducing fuzzy difference of the actual distance between twopoints.
$\mathrm{h}$ our model, two companies, the leader and the follower, establish their facil-
mulate these problems as amedianoid problem and a centroid problem respectively,
and show the domains which contain the solutions for these problems.
Keywords, continuous location, noncooperative games, fuzzy programming
1Introduction
Competitive location problems were introduced by H.Hotelling [1], who studied the Nash
equilibrium problem of two sellers on a linear market. S.L.Hakimi considered the Stackelberg
equilibrium problem on anetwork [2], that is, two companies “leader” and “follower” establish
their facilities on nodes in order to capture as much buying power as possible. He showed
that the problem is $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$-hard. Z.Drezner studied the same kind of acompetitive problem on
aplane [3]. Although alarge number of studies have been made on Nash equilibrium, but
there is few on Stackelberg equilibrium.
Many of these kind of models were based on ahypothesis that the customers utilize strictly
the nearest facility. But actually, customers at ademand point measure the distance to the
facilities by some mental way and choose one which is relatively near. We assume that they
do not distinguish the small difference between two distances, i.e., they do not always feel
l.Olkm is nearer than $1.05\mathrm{k}\mathrm{m}$ . So we introduce relative distance and fuzzy set to represent
the concept of nearness, which is determined by actual distances between facilities and a
customer.
In out model, leader $X$ and follower $\mathrm{Y}$ establish their facilities on the market in order
to capture as much buying power as possible. $X$ locate his facility first, and $\mathrm{Y}$ locates his
facility, knowing the decision of the company $X$ . So, the company $X$ must determine his
optimal location by considering that the competitor locate his facility myopically afterward.
There are two types of problems, i.e., to find the optimal location for $\mathrm{Y}$ and to find that for
X. We formulate these problems as amedianoid problem and acentroid problem, and show
the domains which contain the solutions for these problems.
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2Our Model and Formulation
2.1 Relative Distance
Let $d(p,x)$ denote the distance between ademand point $P$ and the facility $X$ . We introduce
the following function $f_{\mathrm{Y}}$ which represent the relative distance between $P$ and $\mathrm{Y}$ , when the
location of $X$ is given.
$f_{\mathrm{Y}}[p,y|x)$ $=$ $\frac{d[p,y)-d(\rho,x)}{\frac{d(p,y)+d(p,x)}{2}}$
Function $f_{X}$ can be defined by the same way. By introducing acoefficient $\alpha>0$ which
satisfies $d(p, y)=\alpha \mathrm{d}(\mathrm{p},$x), we can redefine $f_{\mathrm{Y}}$ as follows.
A $( \alpha)=\frac{2(\alpha-1)}{\alpha+1}$ , $\alpha=\frac{d[p,y)}{d(p,x)}$
provided that when $d(p,x)=0$ and $d\zeta p,$ et) $\neq 0$ then $f_{\mathrm{Y}}(\alpha)=2$ , when $\mathrm{d}(\mathrm{p},$ x) $=0$ and
$d(p,y)=0$ then $f_{\mathrm{Y}}(\alpha)=0$.
2.2 Evaluating the Relative Distance









$f_{0}$ , $f_{1}$ are constants which satisfy $0<f\mathrm{o}<f1<2$ .
If $g=1$ then customers feel $X$ and $\mathrm{Y}$ are at the same distance. If $g=0$ then they feel $X$ or
$\mathrm{Y}$ is obviously near.
2.3 Preference
Customers utilze facilty Y only when they feel Y is nearer than X. We use the fuzzy set
$\tilde{\mathrm{Y}}$
for relative nearness with the folowing membership function.
$\mu_{\mathrm{Y}}(\alpha)=\{$
1, $0\leq\alpha\leq\alpha_{0}$




$\alpha 0$ , $\alpha_{1}$ are constants which satisfies $\frac{2(\alpha 0-1)}{\alpha 0+1}=-f1$ , $\frac{2(\alpha_{1}-1)}{\alpha_{1}+1}=-f_{0}$ and $0<\alpha 0<\alpha_{1}<$
$1$ . Figure 1shows the shape of the preference function $\mu_{\mathrm{Y}}(\alpha)$ . Note that the curves are
hyperbolas.
We assume that one’s profit is in proportion to the amount of captured buying power,
which is shared in proportion to $\mu_{\mathrm{Y}}(\alpha)$ . The sum of aU buying power is always assumed to
-
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Figure 1: Preference function $\mu_{\mathrm{Y}}(\alpha)$
2.4 Medianoid Problem and Centroid Problem
Using adistribution function $F(p)$ , the profit of $\mathrm{Y}$ is denoted by
$M_{\mathrm{Y}}(x,y)= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\mu_{\mathrm{Y}}(\alpha)dF(p)=\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\mu_{\mathrm{Y}}(p,x,y)dF(p)$ .
With given $x$ , medianoid problem is the problem to find $y$ which maximizes $M_{\mathrm{Y}}(x, y)$ . Let
$y^{*}(x)$ denote the solution for the problem, then centroid problem is to find $x$ which satis-fies $\max_{x}M_{X}(x, y^{*}(x))$ . Since this game is zero sum game, this problem is equivalent to
$\min_{x}M_{\mathrm{Y}}(x, y^{*}(x))$ .
3 Uniform Distribution on aLine
We investigate alinear market on the interval $[0, 1]$ . Function $M_{\mathrm{Y}}$ becomes
$M_{\mathrm{Y}}(x, y)$ $=$ $\int_{\nu_{\tilde{1}}+\propto}^{\min_{+\alpha_{0}}\{1,\}}xdF(p)\nu_{\tilde{1-\alpha_{0}}}^{-\alpha x}$
$+$ $\int_{\nu+\alpha x}^{\nu+\alpha_{1}ae}\tilde{\mp^{1+\alpha_{0}}}1\alpha g(p)dF(p)+\int_{\min\{1}^{\min\{1,\frac{\nu^{-\alpha}1^{x}}{1-\alpha_{1}}\}},\frac{y-\alpha ax}{1-\alpha_{0}}\}g(p)dF(p)$
$+$
$\frac{1}{2}\int_{0}^{\max\{0,\frac{-ax+\alpha_{1}y}{-1+\alpha_{1}}\}}dF(p)+\frac{1}{2}\int_{\frac{x+\alpha_{1}yy+\alpha 1\alpha_{1}}{1+\alpha_{1}}}^{\mp^{x}}dF(p)+\frac{1}{2}\int_{\min\{1}^{1},\frac{y-\alpha ax}{1-\alpha_{1}}1dF(p)$
$+$ $\int_{\max\{0,\frac{-\frac{-ae+\alpha_{0}y}{ae+\alpha_{\rceil}y-1+\alpha 0_{1}}}{-1+\alpha_{1}}}^{\max\{0,\}}h(p)dF(p)+\int_{x_{\tilde{1}}+\alpha}^{\frac{x+\alpha y}{+\alpha_{0}1+\alpha_{1}y}}h(p)dF(p)$ .
Obviously, if $x> \frac{1}{2}$ then $\mathrm{Y}$ gets no advantage by locating at $y>x$ . So, we consider the case
where $x \leq\frac{1}{2}$ and $y>x$ .
Now we investigate the change of $M_{\mathrm{Y}}$ with given $x$ . Let $M_{1\mathrm{Y}}$ denote the first term of
$M\gamma$ . It becomes
$M_{1\mathrm{Y}}(x, y)= \int_{\frac{\min_{\nu+\circ}\{x}{1+\alpha_{0}}}^{1,\}}1dp=\nu_{\tilde{1-\alpha_{0}}}^{-\alpha ae}\{$




$M_{2\mathrm{Y}}(x, y)$ $=$ $\int_{\frac{\nu+\alpha x\nu+\alpha\tilde{1+\alpha_{0}}}{1+\alpha_{1}}}^{x}(1-\frac{\frac{2(1-\alpha_{0})}{1+\alpha 0}+\frac{2(_{\mathrm{p}-ax}^{L^{-}S}-1)}{\mathrm{A}^{-}A\mathrm{p}-x+1}}{2(\frac{2(1-\alpha_{0})}{1+\alpha_{0}}-\frac{2(1-\alpha_{1})}{1+\alpha_{1}})})dp$
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$=$ $\frac{3(\alpha_{1}-\alpha 0)}{4(1+\alpha 0)(1+\alpha_{1})}(y-x)$
Since the coefficient of $y$ is positive, Miy is lnear and increasing on the interval
$(x, 1]$ .
$M_{3\mathrm{Y}}(x, y)= \int_{\min\{1_{\tilde{1-\alpha_{0}}}^{y-\alpha ax}\}}^{\min\{1,\frac{y-\alpha_{1^{l}}}{1-\alpha_{1}}\}},(1-\frac{\frac{2(1-\alpha 0)}{1+\alpha_{0}}+\frac{2(_{\mathrm{r}-*}^{\mathrm{L}^{-}A}-1\underline{)}}{-\frac{y-\mathrm{p}}{\mathrm{p}-*}+1}}{2(\frac{2(1-\alpha 0)}{-_{1+\alpha_{0}}}-\frac{2(1-\alpha_{1}1}{1+\alpha_{1}})})dp$ .
When $\frac{y-\alpha_{0}x}{1-\alpha 0}<1$ , $\frac{y-\alpha_{1}x}{1-\alpha_{1}}<1$ , $\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}.$ , $x$ $<y<1-\alpha_{1}(1-x)$ then the coefficient of
$y$ is positive,
so $M_{3\mathrm{Y}}$ is linear and increasing function on this interval.
When $\frac{y-\alpha 0x}{1-\alpha_{0}}<1,1<\frac{y-\alpha_{1}x}{1-\alpha_{1}}$, $\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}.$ , $1-\alpha 0(1-x)<y<1-\alpha_{1}(1-x)$ then the
third
tem becomes more complicated and the second partial derivative of
$M_{3\mathrm{Y}}$ with respect to $y$
becomes
$\frac{\partial^{2}M_{3\mathrm{Y}}(x,y)}{\partial y^{2}}=\frac{-(1+\alpha 0)(1+\alpha_{1})(-1+x)^{2}}{2(\alpha_{0}-\alpha_{1})(x-y)(-2+x+y)^{2}}<0$
So $M_{3\mathrm{Y}}$ is concave downward on this interval.
When $1< \frac{y-\alpha \mathrm{o}x}{1-\alpha 0}$ , $1< \frac{y-\alpha_{1}x}{1-\alpha_{1}}$ , $\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}.$ , $y>1-\alpha_{0}(1-x)$ then the third term becomes
$M_{3\mathrm{Y}}(x, y)=0$ .
The fourth term becomes
$M_{4\mathrm{Y}}(x,y)= \frac{1}{2}\int_{0}^{\mathrm{n}1\mathrm{R}\{0,\frac{-arrow+\alpha_{1l}}{-1+\alpha_{1}}\}}1dp=\{$
0, $\frac{a_{1}y-x}{\alpha_{1}-1}\leq 0$
$\neq^{\alpha_{\mathrm{L}^{-l}}}2\alpha_{1}-\urcorner 1$ , otherwise
So $M_{4\mathrm{Y}}$ is linear and strictly decreasing function where $y< \frac{x}{\alpha_{1}}$ .
The fifth term becomes
$M_{5\mathrm{Y}}(x,y)= \frac{1}{2}\int_{\frac{\approx+\frac{y+\alpha_{1^{t}}}{1+\alpha_{1}\alpha_{1}y}}{1+\alpha_{1}}}1dp=\frac{(1-\alpha_{1})}{2(1+\alpha_{1})}(y-x)$
Since the coefficient of $y$ is positive, $M_{5\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ linear and increasing on the interval
$(x, 1)$ .





So $M_{6\mathrm{Y}}$ is linear and increasing function where $y<1-\alpha_{1}(1-x)$ .
When $’-x>\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} 0$$\underline{\alpha}_{1,\alpha_{1}-1},\alpha 0y-x>0\overline{\overline{\alpha}_{0}-1}$ , $\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e},$ . $x<y< \frac{x}{\alpha_{1}}$ then the seventh term is linear and strictly
increasing.
When $\frac{\alpha_{1}y-x}{\alpha_{1}-1}<0$ , $\frac{\alpha 0y-x}{\alpha 0-1}>0$ , i.e., $\frac{x}{\alpha_{1}}<y<\frac{x}{\alpha 0}$ then the seventh term is not
lnear and
the second derivative of $M_{7\mathrm{Y}}$ with respect to $y$ becomes
$\frac{\partial^{2}M_{7\mathrm{Y}}(x,y)}{\partial y^{2}}=\frac{(1+\alpha_{0})(1+\alpha_{1})x^{2}}{2(\alpha 0-\alpha_{1})(x-y)(x+y)^{2}}>0$
Therefore $\mathrm{M}7\mathrm{y}$ is concave upward on the interval $( \frac{x}{\alpha_{1}}, \frac{x}{\alpha 0})$ .
When $\frac{\alpha_{1}y-x}{\alpha_{1}-1}<0,\alpha\Delta \mathrm{A}_{\frac{-x}{-1}}\alpha 0<0$ , i.e., $y> \frac{x}{\alpha 0}$ then $M_{7\mathrm{Y}}(x, y)=0$ .
The eighth term $M_{8\mathrm{Y}}$ becomes
$M_{8\mathrm{Y}}(x,y)= \int_{\epsilon+}^{\frac{\approx+\alpha_{1\mathrm{V}}}{\tilde{1+\alpha_{0}}1+a_{1}\alpha y}}(\frac{\frac{2(\alpha 0-1[perp]}{1+\alpha 0}+-_{1+\frac{\underline y-\mathrm{p}}{\mathrm{p}-x}}2(_{\mathrm{r}-x}^{\mathrm{L}^{-}A}-\underline{1)}}{2(\frac{2(\alpha 0-1\lrcorner}{1+\alpha 0}-\frac{2(\alpha_{1}-1)}{-_{1+\alpha_{1}}})})dp=\frac{(\alpha_{1}-\alpha 0)}{4(1+\alpha 0)(1+\alpha_{1})}(y-x)$
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Since the coefficient of $y$ is positive, $M_{8Y}$ is linear and increasing function on the interval
$(x, 1]$ .
Comparing the slopes of $M_{1Y}\cdots$ $M_{8\mathrm{Y}}$ on each interval, the maximal value of My existson the interval $[1-\alpha_{1}(1-x), 1-\mathrm{a}\mathrm{o}(1-x)]$ . In this interval, $M_{1\mathrm{Y}}$ , $M_{2\mathrm{Y}}$ , $M_{5Y}$ , M&y are linearfunctions, M$y $=0$ , $M_{6\mathrm{Y}}=0$ . So we check $M_{3\mathrm{Y}}+M_{7\mathrm{Y}}$ as follows.
$\frac{\partial^{2}(M_{3\mathrm{Y}}+M_{7\mathrm{Y}})}{\partial y^{2}}=\frac{-(1+\alpha 0)(1+\alpha_{1})(x(2x+2y-3)-y)}{2(\alpha_{0}-\alpha_{1})(x+y-2)^{2}(x+y)^{2}}<0$
Therefore $M_{3\mathrm{Y}}+M_{7\mathrm{Y}}$ is concave downward.
Considering $M_{4\mathrm{Y}}=0$ and $M_{6\mathrm{Y}}=0$ , My becomes
$M_{Y}(x, y)= \frac{1}{2}+\frac{(1+\alpha_{0})(1-\alpha_{1})(1-x-y)}{4(\alpha_{0}-\alpha_{1})}-\frac{(1+\alpha_{0})(1+\alpha_{1})(x-y)\log(\frac{x+y}{2-x-y})}{8(\alpha_{0}-\alpha_{1})}$ .
So, the location of $y$ which maximizes $M_{Y}$ , i.e., the solution for the medianoid problem existson the extreme points of the interval $[1 -\alpha_{1}(1-x), 1-\alpha_{0}(1-x)]$ or on the point which
makes the derivative zero as follows.
$\frac{\partial M_{\mathrm{Y}}}{\partial y}=$
$=0$
This equation cannot be solved by algebraic way, but we can solve actual concrete problems
by some numerical methods. Let $\overline{y}$ denote the solution, then the solution for the medianoid
problem with given $x$ is
$y^{*}(x)= \max_{y}M_{\mathrm{Y}}(x, y)$ , $y=\{1-\alpha_{1}(1-x),\overline{y}, 1-\alpha_{0}(1-x)\}$ .
Then the solution for the centroid problem is
$x^{*}= \min_{x}M_{\mathrm{Y}}(x, y^{*}(x))$ .
On the above part, we treated $x$ as agiven number, since $X$ locate his facility first. Let
$R_{\mathrm{Y}}=\{(x, y)\}$ denote the set of $\mathrm{Y}’ \mathrm{s}$ optimal reaction strategy against $X$ , then $Mr(x)=$
$Mr(x)$ $y)$ , $(x, y)\in Ry$ is the set of peak points of the functions My which shapes are fixed
by the location of $x$ .
Then the solution for the centroid problem is rewrote as follows.
$x^{*}= \min_{x}M_{R}(x)$
We can examine the concavity of the function $Mr(x)$ by using the symmetricity between
$x$ and $y$ .
4Separated Market on aLine
In this section, we investigate aliner market with agap where no customer exists. We assume
the width of gap is denoted by $S$ and the market is symmetrical about the middle point. In
this case, following properties hold.
Property 1The solution for the medianoid problem and the centroid problem are on the
interval [0, 1]. More generally, they are in the convex hull of demand points.
Brief Proof If $x<0$ then $\mathrm{Y}$ can get $1$ ( $=\mathrm{a}11$ buying power) locating at $y=0$. Similar logic
holds in other cases
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or $\{$
Property 2The solution for the centroid problem does not exist on the gap. This property
holds even if there are more than one gap.
Brief Proof If $x \geq\frac{1}{2}$ is on the gap, then there exist some points on the interval $[ \frac{1-S}{2},x]$
where $\mathrm{Y}$ can get more than $\frac{1}{2}$ by making $\frac{y-\alpha_{1}x}{1-\alpha_{1}}$ greater than $\frac{1+S}{2}$ .
At first, we investigate the case where $X$ is on the extreme point, i.e., $x= \frac{1-S}{2}$ . In this
case, if the gap is narrow then $\mathrm{Y}$ can get more than $\frac{1}{2}$ by moving $y$ ffom $\frac{1+S}{2}$ to 1, making
$\mathrm{u}+\alpha 1+\alpha^{\frac{x}{0}}\Delta$ greater than $\frac{1+S}{2}$ . However, if the gap is wide, $\mathrm{Y}$ cannot increase his profit by moving
ffom $\frac{1+S}{2}$ to any direction. So we check the condition that $\mathrm{Y}$ cannot get more than $\frac{1}{2}$ . The
critical point is where $\frac{\alpha \mathrm{o}y-x}{\alpha_{0}-1}$ becomes less than 0, so the condition is $S \geq\frac{1-\alpha 0}{1+\alpha 0}$ .
Therefore if the gap is wider than or equal to $\mp 1\alpha 01-\alpha r$ , the solutions for the centroid problem




In this case, $X,\mathrm{Y}$ share the buying power half and half.
When $S< \frac{1-}{1+}\alpha_{\Delta}\alpha 0$ ’ if $x$ , $y$ are on the extreme points, i.e., $x= \frac{1-S}{2},y=\frac{1+S}{2}$ then
$\mathrm{Y}$ can
get more buying power by moving to the right while the inequalty $\frac{1+S}{2}\leq\mapsto+\alpha_{\Delta_{\frac{x}{0}}}1+\alpha$ holds.
$\mathrm{Y}$
begin to lose some buying power when the inequalty $\frac{y+\alpha_{1}x}{1+\alpha_{1}}\leq\frac{1+S}{2}$ or $\frac{y-\alpha_{0}x}{1-\alpha_{0}}\leq 1$ holds. So,
if $X$ locate at $x= \frac{1-S}{2}$ then the solution $y^{*}$ for the medianoid problem satisfies the following
inequalty.
$\frac{(1+S)(1+\alpha_{0})}{2}-\alpha_{0}x\leq y^{*}$ $\leq \mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}$.$\{\alpha_{0}x+1-\alpha 0, \frac{(1+\alpha_{1})(1+S)}{2}-\alpha_{1}x\}$
So, when $S< \frac{1-\alpha}{1+\alpha}\mathrm{A}0$ and $x= \frac{1-S}{2}$ , $\mathrm{Y}$ can get more thm $\frac{1}{2}$ by locating at $y^{*}$ . Conversely
thinking, $X$ may have better solution in this case, i.e., at the beginning $X$ locate at the point
symmetrical with $y^{*}$ , not $\frac{1-S}{2}$ . But in this case $\mathrm{Y}$ can get more buying power by moving
ffom $y^{*}$ to 1, since $M_{1\mathrm{Y}}++M_{2\mathrm{Y}}+M_{3\mathrm{Y}}+M_{7\mathrm{Y}}+M_{8\mathrm{Y}}$ is concave downward (same as uniform
distribution).
Figure 3and 4shows the results of numerical experiment with $\alpha 0=0.45$ , $\alpha_{1}=0.8$ . Figure
3 shows a market with wide gap $(S= \frac{1}{2})$ and Figure 4 shows the case of narrow gap
$(S= \frac{1}{8})$ .
On each figure, the seven curves show the value of $M_{\mathrm{Y}}$ in $x=0.2,0.25,0.3,0.35,0.4,0.45,0.5$
from the left to the right, respectively. The graphs are drawn for $y$ on $[x,0.9]$ .
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Figure 3: S $= \frac{1}{2}$ Figure 4: $S= \frac{1}{8}$
When $S= \frac{1}{2}$ , the solution for centroid problem is $x=0.25$ which makes My less than or
equal to $\frac{1}{2}$ . When $S= \frac{1}{8}$ , it can read that $x=0.3$ is agood approximation solution for
centroid problem.
5Conclusion
$\bullet$ We use the preference based on fuzzy relative difference of distance.
$\bullet$ Competitive facility location problems with “leader” and “follower” are formulated as
the centroid problem and the medianoid medianoid problem.
$\bullet$ The interval is shown which contains the solution for the medianoid problem on alinear
market with uniform distribution.
$\bullet$ In the divided market, the conditions are shown for which the solution for the centroid
problem does not come to the extreme points of amarket.
$\bullet$ In the divided market, the domain is shown in which the solution for the medianoid
problem exists.
Our further research is finding asolution with other distributions, and extending the market
on aplane.
References
[1] H.Hotelling, “Stability in Competition” , The Economic Journal, Vo1.30, pp. 41-57, 1929.
[2] S.L.Hakimi, “On Locating New Facilities in aCompetitive Environment”, European
Journal of Operational Research, Vo1.12, pp. 29-35, 1983.
[3] Z.Drezner, “Competitive Location Strategies for Two Facilities”, Regional Science and
Urban Economics, Vo1.12, pp. 485-493, 1982.
[4] Z.Drezner and E.Zemel, “Competitive Location In the Plan\"e, Annals of Operations
Research, Vo1.40, pp. 173-193, 1992.
[5] H.A.Eiselt, “Hotelling’s Duopoly on aTr $\mathrm{e}^{\text{\"{e}}}$ , Annals of Operations Research, Vo1.40,
pp.19 -26, 1992.
[6] S.Osumi, S.Shiode, H.Ishii and Y.Teraoka, “A Competitive Facility Location Problem” ,
Proceedings of The Third Conference of The Association of Asian-Pacific Operational
Research Societies (APORS), World Scientific, pp.251-257, 1995.
[7] S.Osumi, S.Shiode, H.Ishii and Y.Teraoka, “A Competitive Facility Location Problem
with Establishing Cost”, Mathematica Japonica Vo1.48, No.1, pp.19-26, 1998
217
